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ON BEING “BOUND THEREBY” 
Alison L. LaCroix* 
I propose revising Article VI, paragraph 2, of the United 
States Constitution to read as follows (my amendments noted in 
italics): 
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which 
shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or 
which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, 
shall be the supreme law of the land. The judges in every state 
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws 
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. The Supreme 
Court shall have appellate jurisdiction to review the decisions 
of the judges in the several states on questions concerning this 
Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made 
under the authority of the United States. 
As this redrafting suggests, I seek to fill in the textual gap 
between Article III and the Supremacy Clause on the question 
of the Supreme Court’s power to review decisions of state courts 
that are based on federal law. The current state of the doctrine 
holds that the two provisions, read together, add up to 
something like a constitutional norm that the Supreme Court 
should have some power to review state-court decisions. This 
norm is a result of a form of common law constitutionalism in 
which the text has interacted with interpretations by judges, 
politicians, and the people to generate an almost supra-textual 
structural understanding.1 
For many observers, that mix of text, caselaw, and 
underlying theory is sufficient to cement the Court’s power of 
vertical judicial review of state-court decisions. In courses on 
federal courts and constitutional law, students and professors 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 
 1. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (explaining the 
common law understanding of constitutional interpretation); David A. Strauss, Common 
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 932 (1996) (“Particularly if a 
textual approach draws ‘structural’ inferences (as it probably must to be plausible), 
textual interpretation is a high legal art form.”).  
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routinely spend hours flipping back and forth between Articles 
III and VI, reading them together and constructing chains of 
logic to arrive at a partially interstitial, partially extrapolated 
conception of what the document says about the Supreme 
Court’s authority to overturn state courts’ decisions. But for 
critics, this amalgam is not a sufficient basis for the Court to 
exercise this power, and it is in anticipation of future litigation—
and in recognition of past controversies—that I propose making 
the power part of the constitutional text. 
The accumulated common law of Supreme Court review of 
state courts’ decisions rests on a triangulation among three 
sources: (1) reading Articles III and the Supremacy Clause 
together, such that the Court is both the ultimate structural 
repository of the “judicial Power of the United States”2 and the 
force that determines when the “Judges in every State”3 have 
failed to be bound by the supreme law of the land; (2) the 
Court’s own decisions, from Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee4 and 
Cohens v. Virginia5 in the early nineteenth century to Testa v. 
Katt6 and Cooper v. Aaron7 in the twentieth; and (3) section 25 of 
the foundational Judiciary Act of 1789,8 which established the 
Court’s review of state courts’ decisions by the mechanism of a 
writ of error. Other bases for this authority include the debates 
at the Constitutional Convention and in the state ratifying 
conventions.9 The supremacy of the Court, and its resulting 
authority to invalidate decisions of the highest courts of the 
states, have therefore been established through a blend of 
textual, doctrinal, and statutory sources. The power is supremacy 
in action, put into practice over the course of at least two 
 
 2. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 3. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
 4. 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (holding that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review 
state courts’ decisions in civil cases). 
 5. 19 U.S. 264 (1819) (holding that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to review 
state courts’ decisions in criminal cases). 
 6. 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (requiring state courts to enforce U.S. penal laws and 
rejecting Rhode Island’s claim that it, as a sovereign, could not be compelled to enforce 
the penal laws of another sovereign). 
 7. 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that all state officials—legislative, executive, and 
judicial—were bound by the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, and that 
the Court would enforce this holding against the state of Arkansas). 
 8. 1 Stat. 73–93.  
 9. In the Virginia ratification convention, for example, Edmund Randolph 
insisted, “If a particular state should be at liberty, through its judiciary, to prevent or 
impede the operation of the general government, the latter must soon be undermined. It 
is, then, necessary that its jurisdiction should ‘extend to all cases in law and equity arising 
under this Constitution and the laws of the United States.’” See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, 
DEBATES 570 (Lippencott Co., 1891). 
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centuries’ worth of theory and interpretation. It is so central to 
the Constitution’s federal structure that one might have a hard 
time imagining that it could be attacked. 
Some foundational practices and concepts of the American 
constitutional structure are so deeply ingrained in the political 
and legal system, as well as the nation’s self-narrative, that they 
do seem essentially unchallengeable. Examples include judicial 
review, the separation of powers, and federalism itself. None of 
these is explicitly set out in the Constitution, and yet each of 
them is a fundamental, supra-constitutional element of the 
nation’s legal structure—perhaps due, at least in part, to the fact 
that none of them is confined to a mere textual provision. 
Supreme Court review of state-court decisions might also seem 
to fall into this category. As Henry Wheaton wrote in 1821, 
This supremacy is expressly declared in the Constitution; and 
if it were not declared, it must necessarily be so, from the very 
nature of our federative government. Where there is collision 
and repugnancy, the parts cannot control the whole; the 
whole must control the parts: otherwise there would be worse 
confusion than if we had no General Government.10 
At various times in the nation’s history, however, 
determined groups of individuals have mounted campaigns to 
use Congress’ power under Article III, section 2, to make 
“exceptions and regulations” to the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction as a means of removing specific subjects from the 
Court’s appellate review or to cut off that review altogether. The 
early national period, which witnessed the creation of the review 
under the 1789 Judiciary Act and its endorsement by the 
Marshall Court, provides ample evidence of the vigor with which 
opponents attacked the Court’s jurisdiction to review state 
adjudications. Many critics, most notably several prominent 
Virginia judges, argued that granting the Supreme Court the 
power to overturn state-court decisions, even on issues of federal 
law, amounted to an invasion of state sovereignty—what modern 
commentators might term a commandeering of the state 
judiciary. In the Virginia Court of Appeals’ decision in Hunter v. 
Martin, which was subsequently invalidated in Justice Joseph 
Story’s opinion for the Court in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Judge 
William Cabell wrote: 
 
 10. Henry Wheaton, The Dangers of the Union, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 249, 253 
(James Pfander ed., 1995). 
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It must have been foreseen that controversies would 
somehow arise as to the boundaries of the two jurisdictions. 
Yet the constitution has provided no umpire, has erected no 
tribunal by which they shall be settled. The omission 
proceeded, probably, from the belief, that such a tribunal 
would produce evils greater than those of the occasional 
collision which it would be designed to remedy.11 
For Cabell and other critics, those greater evils included threats 
to local authority and potentially antidemocratic federal 
aggrandizement.12 Fifteen years after the Court’s decision in 
Martin, as the nullification crisis gathered force, the Judiciary 
Committee of the House of Representatives endorsed a bill to 
repeal section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.13 The repeal effort 
ultimately failed, but efforts to limit or repeal the Court’s 
jurisdiction over state-court decisions regularly continue to 
appear and galvanize political attention, even if only briefly.14 
On one hand, then, there is an apparent common-law-based 
constitutional consensus that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
to review at least some state-court cases, and that section 25—or 
its expanded, modern incarnation, 28 U.S.C. § 1257—is 
practically constitutionally required. On the other hand, 
however, the text does not explicitly provide for such review, 
rendering the review vulnerable to attack by anyone who 
opposes broad federal power as a general matter or who 
disapproves of what the Court says about a particular 
 
 11. Hunter v. Martin, 4 Munf. 1, 5 (Va. 1815). Like his outspoken and politically 
active colleague Spencer Roane, Cabell was relatively untroubled by the prospect of 
inferior federal courts as the mechanism by which the judicial power of the U.S. would be 
exercised to maintain federal supremacy. Cabell’s concern was what he regarded as the 
invasion of the judicial power of the sovereign states by the Supreme Court’s writs of 
error more than the expansion of federal power through federal institutions. Id.at 9. On 
early national commentators’ conception of the relationship between Supreme Court 
review of state-court decisions and the establishment and jurisdiction of the inferior 
federal courts, see Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, 30 
LAW & HIST. REV. (forthcoming 2012). 
 12. Indeed, Cabell endorsed inferior federal courts as a preferable means of 
assuaging concerns about federal uniformity. “All the purposes of the constitution of the 
United States will be answered by the erection of Federal Courts, into which any party, 
plaintiff or defendant, concerned in a case of federal cognizance, may carry it for 
adjudication.” 4 Munf. at 9. 
 13. On the attempt at repeal, see Mark Graber, James Buchanan as Savior? Judicial 
Power, Political Fragmentation, and the Failed 1831 Repeal of Section 25, 88 OR. L. REV. 
95 (2009). 
 14. See, e.g., S. 481, 97th Cong. (1981); S. 1742, 97th Cong. (1981) (bills introduced 
by Senator Jesse Helms providing that neither the Supreme Court nor any federal district 
court shall have jurisdiction of any case arising out of state or local law or rule “which 
relates to voluntary prayer in public schools and buildings”). 
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substantive issue. Those observers who are most supportive of 
the review also tend to be comfortable with its status as an 
implicit constitutional norm, and indeed with such implicit 
norms in general. This leaves the practice open to attack by 
critics, who point to the review’s lack of firm textual background 
and who are themselves often uneasy with practices that are 
based on non- or supra-textual foundations. 
Without an explicit guarantee in the text of the 
Constitution, one could imagine a scenario in which Congress 
repealed section 25 of the 1789 Judiciary Act and its modern 
statutory descendants, pursuant to Congress’s powers under 
Article III, sec. 2 to make “exceptions and regulations” to the 
Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The Court’s appellate 
power would thus be limited to appeals from the inferior federal 
courts. The question would then become the scope of Congress’s 
“exceptions and regulations” authority. An influential line of 
thought beginning with Henry Hart’s 1953 Dialogue maintains 
that any exceptions Congress makes to the Court’s jurisdiction 
“must not be such as will destroy the essential role of the 
Supreme Court in the constitutional plan.”15 In addition, Justice 
Story’s opinion in Martin offers a full-throated structural 
argument that the review is constitutionally required.16 
Nevertheless, one wonders how far such an argument would go 
toward convincing a hypothetical group of committed textualists 
and state sovereigntists that not only are the judges in the states 
“bound” by the supreme law of the land, this bindingness must 
be given institutional force through the Supreme Court’s 
oversight of state courts where federal issues are concerned. 
Although textualist and originalist arguments might respond 
that my proposal represents an unwarranted extension of the 
Supreme Court’s—and perhaps the federal government’s—
authority, I submit that the adoption of Article III plus the 
Supremacy Clause in fact represented not the outer boundary of 
what the founders believed would be the general government’s 
power to rein in the states, but a toned-down version of blunter 
control mechanisms proposed at the Constitutional Convention. 
 
 15. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal 
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1953). The argument is 
also often termed the “essential functions” theory. See, e.g., Leonard G. Ratner, 
Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. 
REV. 157 (1960). 
 16. Martin, 14 U.S. at 327–345. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist 
View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B. U. L. REV. 205 
(1985) (giving a modern adaptation of Story’s arguments).  
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Most notable among these leashes was James Madison’s 
proposal to give the federal government (either the Senate or a 
“council of revision” comprising the president and some number 
of Supreme Court justices) the power to veto legislative acts by 
the states.17 Madison clearly envisioned the veto as a means of 
establishing the federal level of government as a gatekeeper over 
state legislators.18 With the convention’s rejection of Madison’s 
veto, the delegates turned from a legislation-centered 
mechanism of policing the states to the looser, judicially focused 
device of the Supremacy Clause plus Article III. In the 1770s and 
early 1780s, many observers believed that dividing sovereignty 
required careful delineation of legislative powers. By 1789, that 
consensus had shifted to focus on courts as the overseers of the 
balance between sovereigns. 
In proposing this revision to help close the gap between the 
text and the accumulated constitutional sensibility about 
Supreme Court review of state court decisions, my principal 
concern is to ground the clause’s sweeping, self-executing 
definition of the “supreme law of the land” in a specific legal 
institution. Given the belief of many delegates to the 
Constitutional Convention that a judicial solution to the problem 
of supremacy was preferable to legislative approaches such as 
Madison’s negative, and given the sharp disagreement among 
the delegates about the propriety of establishing inferior federal 
courts, the Supreme Court can reasonably be viewed as the locus 
of supremacy. Indeed, the dominance in traditional doctrinal 
narratives of the “Madisonian Compromise,” according to which 
the drafters of the Constitution agreed to postpone the divisive 
question of the creation of inferior federal courts to the first 
Congress, suggests that a meta-rule setting forth the mechanics 
of supremacy belongs in the federalism-mediating domain of 
Article VI rather than in Article III, with its emphasis on the 
separation of powers between the Court and Congress.19 
 
 17. See ALISON L. LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
FEDERALISM 132–75 (2010) (discussing the bases of authority for a central government).  
 18. For example, Madison argued on the floor of the convention that “[t]he States 
[could] of themselves pass no operative act, any more than one branch of a Legislature 
where there are two branches can proceed without the other.” 1 MAX FARRAND, THE 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 165 (1966) (Madison’s statements 
from June 8 to the Committee of the Whole). 
 19. For the foundational statement of the Madisonian compromise, see RICHARD 
H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 7–9 (4th ed. 1996). See also Martin H. Redish & Curtis E. Woods, 
Congressional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical 
Review and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 52–56 (1975); Robert N. Clinton, A 
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Indeed, the “shall” language in my proposal, combined with 
the broad definition of the set of cases over which the Court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction, is intended to leave room for 
Congress to regulate the precise boundaries of the Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause of Article III. 
To do otherwise—e.g., by adding language to Article III, section 
2, paragraph 2 along the lines of “although the power to make 
such exceptions and regulations shall not extend to the cases 
mentioned in Article VI, para. 2”—would make mandatory the 
full extent of the Court’s appellate power. That interpretation, if 
treated not just as a forward-looking amendment to the 
Constitution but rather as a reassertion of a single correct 
original understanding of the Constitution, would suggest that 
section 25 itself was in some essential sense void, insofar as it did 
not grant appellate jurisdiction to the Court in cases where the 
state court had upheld, rather than denying, a claim of federal 
right. My proposal aims to provide a textual foundation for a 
common law norm in line with both eighteenth-century views 
and evolving constitutional practice, not to use a narrow quasi-
historical methodology to deny the ultimately deeply historical 
fact of change over time. 
For similar reasons, I do not propose amending the 
Constitution to guarantee judicial review as a general matter. In 
their broadest sense, debates over the necessity, meaning, and 
valence of judicial review—in both its vertical, federalism-
focused form and its horizontal, separation-of-powers form—
have lain at the heart of Anglo-American law since the early 
seventeenth century.20 I would not wish to enshrine a particular 
twenty-first (or, worse, twentieth-century) view of those debates 
in the Constitution. One broad constitutional value, arguably 
shared by both originalists and living-constitutionalists, is that 
certain broad constitutional values are so foundational that they 
resist a parol-evidence-rule approach to constitutional inter-
pretation that attempts to freeze those values by fixing them in 
text. 
An explicit constitutional statement of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisdiction to review state-court decisions is thus a historically 
appropriate endorsement of the Court’s role as a watchdog over 
 
Mandatory View of Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original 
Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 741, 763–64 (1984). 
 20. See generally Mary Sarah Bilder, Idea or Practice: A Brief Historiography of 
Judicial Review, 20 J. POL’Y HIST. 6 (2008) (presenting a history of judicial review and 
federalism concepts). 
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the federal-state balance and the Republic’s founding 
commitment to multiple levels of governmental authority. Such 
a provision would maintain the twin founding values of multi-
plicity and supremacy: multiplicity by recognizing both the 
federal and state levels of government as constitutionally 
required and significant; supremacy by providing an institutional 
mechanism to ensure that the judges in the states truly are 
bound by the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United 
States. Congress could continue to make regulations and 
exceptions to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 
Article III, section 2, but it could not eliminate the review 
altogether. The review is already present in the common law 
Constitution and in practice. The structural commitment already 
exists. What remains unfinished is the textual ratification and the 
explicit institutional settlement. 
 
